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MATHEMATICAL CONQUERORS, UNGURU
POLARITY, AND THE TASK OF HISTORY
MIKHAIL G. KATZ
Abstract. We compare several approaches to the history of math-
ematics recently proposed by Bl˚asjo¨, Fraser–Schroter, Fried, and
others. We argue that tools from both mathematics and history
are essential for a meaningful history of the discipline.
In an extension of the Unguru–Weil controversy over the con-
cept of geometric algebra, Michael Fried presents a case against
both Andre´ Weil the “privileged observer” and Pierre de Fermat
the “mathematical conqueror.” We analyze Fried’s version of Un-
guru’s alleged polarity between a historian’s and a mathematician’s
history. We identify some axioms of Friedian historiographic ide-
ology, and propose a thought experiment to gauge its pertinence.
Unguru and his disciples Corry, Fried, and Rowe have described
Freudenthal, van der Waerden, andWeil as Platonists but provided
no evidence; we provide evidence to the contrary. We analyze how
the various historiographic approaches play themselves out in the
study of the pioneers of mathematical analysis including Fermat,
Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy.
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1. Introduction
The recent literature features several approaches to the history of
mathematics. Thus, Michael N. Fried ([47], 2018) and Guicciardini
([54], 2018) argue for versions of Unguru’s approach (see below). Bl˚asjo¨
([14], 2014) advocates a rational history as opposed to an “idiosyncrati-
cist” one. Fraser and Schroter propose something of a middle course
that defines the task of the history of mathematics as “our attempt to
explain why a certain mathematical development happened” in ([39],
2019, p. 16). We illustrate the latter approach in Section 3.6, in the
context of certain developments in mathematical analysis from Euler
to Cauchy, following Fraser–Schroter ([40], 2020).
We analyze the perception of mathematical historiography that posits
a polarity between a historical and a mathematical view. Such a per-
ception is often associated with Sabetai Unguru. Against such Unguru
polarity, we argue that tools from both disciplines are both useful and
essential.
1.1. Unguru, Weil, van der Waerden, Freudenthal. Sabetai Un-
guru ([84], 1975) and Andre´ Weil ([93], 1978) famously battled one
MATHEMATICAL CONQUEROR, UNGURU POLARITY, TASK OF HISTORY 3
another over the relation between Greek mathematics and the concept
of geometric algebra, a term introduced by H. G. Zeuthen in 1885 (see
Bl˚asjo¨ [15], 2016, p. 326; Høyrup [58], 2016, pp. 4–6).
We note that B. L. van der Waerden ([90], 1976) and Hans Freuden-
thal ([45], 1977) published responses to Unguru earlier than Weil. A
clarification is in order concerning the meaning of the term geometric
algebra. Van der Waerden explained the term as follows:
We studied the wording of [Euclid’s] theorems and tried
to reconstruct the original ideas of the author. We found
it evident that these theorems did not arise out of ge-
ometrical problems. We were not able to find any in-
teresting geometrical problem that would give rise to
theorems like II 1–4. On the other hand, we found that
the explanation of these theorems as arising from alge-
bra worked well. Therefore we adopted the latter ex-
planation. Now it turns out . . . that what we, working
mathematicians, found evident, is not evident to Un-
guru. Therefore I shall state more clearly the reasons
why I feel that theorems like Euclid II 1–4 did not arise
from geometrical considerations. [90, pp. 203–204] (em-
phasis in the original)
Further details on van der Waerden’s approach can be found in Sec-
tion 2.5.
We refrain from taking a position in the debate on the narrow issue of
geometric algebra as applied to Greek mathematics, but point out that
the debate has stimulated the articulation of various approaches to the
history of mathematics. We will analyze how the various approaches
play themselves out in the study of the pioneers of mathematical anal-
ysis including Fermat, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy; see Section 3. On
whether other historians endorse Unguru polarity, see Section 5.
1.2. Returning from escapades. Readers familiar with the tenor of
the Unguru–Weil controversy will not have been surprised by the tone
of the “break-in” remark found in the 2001 book by Fried and Unguru
(henceforth FU):
The mathematical and the historical approaches are an-
tagonistic. Whoever breaks and enters typically returns
from his escapades with other spoils than the peaceful
and courteous caller. (Fried–Unguru [48], 2001, p. 406;
emphasis on escapades added)
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For readers less familiar with the controversy, it may be prudent to
clarify that the unpeaceful and uncourteous caller allegedly involved in
the break-in is, to be sure, the mathematician, not the historian.
The break-in remark is duly reproduced in a recent essay in the
Journal of Humanistic Mathematics by Unguru’s disciple Fried ([47],
2018, p. 7). And yes, the “escapades” are in the original, both in FU
and in Fried solo.
That Fried’s mentor Unguru does not mince words with regard to
Weil is not difficult to ascertain. Thus, one finds the following phrasing:
“Betrayals, Indignities, and Steamroller Historiography: Andre´ Weil
and Euclid” (Unguru [87], 2018, p. 26, end of Section I).
Clearly, neither unpeaceful break-ins nor uncourteous escapades rep-
resent legitimate relationships to the mathematics of the past. The
break-in remark makes the reader wonder about the precise meaning
of Fried’s assurance that his plan is to catalog some of the attitudes
toward the history of mathematics “without judgment as to whether
they are necessarily correct or legitimate” (Fried [47, abstract, p. 3];
emphasis added).
1.3. Who is open-minded? A further telling comment appears on
the back cover of the FU book on Apollonius of Perga:
Although this volume is intended primarily for histori-
ans of ancient mathematics, its approach is fresh and
engaging enough to be of interest also to historians,
philosophers, linguists, and open-minded mathematicians.
(Fried–Unguru [48], 2001; emphasis added)
Readers will not fail to notice that, of the four classes of scholars men-
tioned, the mathematician is the only class limited by the qualifier
open-minded ; here FU don’t appear to imply that a mathematician
is typically characterized by the qualifier. Such a polarizing approach
(see further in Section 4.2) on the part of FU is hardly consistent with
Fried’s professed idea of cataloguing attitudes toward history “without
judgment as to whether they are . . . correct or legitimate.” We will
analyze the ideological underpinnings of the FU approach in Section 2.
2. FU axiomatics: Discontinuity, tabula rasa, antiplatonism
In this section, we will identify several axioms of historiography ac-
cording to the Unguru school. In the Friedian scheme of things, it is
axiomatic that the proper view of the relation between the mathemat-
ics of the past and that of the present is that of a discontinuity. It is
indeed possible to argue that it is (see Section 3.5 for an example in
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Fermat). However, Fried appears to take it for granted that a contrary
view of continuity between past and present necessarily amounts to
whig history or, more politely, engaging in what Oakeshott described
as a “practical past” and Grattan-Guinness [53] described as “heritage”
(see Fried [47], 2018, p. 7). Fried’s attitude here is at odds with the
idea of historiography as seeking to “explain why a certain mathemat-
ical development happened” (Fraser–Schroter, [39], 2019, p. 16).
2.1. Axiom 1: Discontinuity. What emerges is the following axiom
of Friedian historiographic ideology:
Axiom 1 (discontinuity). The proper attitude of a
historian toward the mathematics of the past is that of
a discontinuity with the mathematics of the present.
We note that, while the discontinuity view may be appropriate in cer-
tain cases, it is an assumption that needs to be argued rather than
posited as an axiom as in Fried.
Fried presents a taxonomy of various attitudes toward the history
of mathematics. He makes it clear that he means to apply his taxon-
omy rather broadly, and not merely to the historical work on Greek
mathematics:
[I]n most of the examples the mathematical past being
considered by one person or another is that of Greece.
. . . Nevertheless, as I hope will be clear, the relation-
ships evoked in the context of these examples have little
to do with the particular character of Greek mathemat-
ics. [47, p. 8]
We will examine the effectiveness of the FU approach in such a broader
context.
2.2. Apollonius and mathematical conquerors. Fried notes that
his piece “has been written in a light and playful spirit” (ibid., p. 8).
Such a light(-headed) spirit is reflected in Fried’s attitude toward Fer-
mat. Fermat’s reconstruction of Apollonius’ Plane Loci prompts Fried
to place Fermat in a category labeled “mathematical conqueror” rather
than that of a historian. The label also covers Descartes and Vie`te,
whose “sense of the past has the unambiguous character of a ‘practical
past’, again to use Oakeshott’s term” [47, pp. 11–12]. Fried does not
spare the great magistrate the tedium of Mahoney’s breezy journalese:
“Fermat was no antiquarian interested in a faithful re-
production of Apollonius’ original work; . . . The Plane
Loci was to serve as a means to an end rather than
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an end in itself.” (Mahoney as quoted by Fried in [47,
p. 11])
Fried appears to endorse Mahoney’s dismissive attitude toward Fer-
mat’s historical work. Regrettably, Fried ignores Recasens’ more bal-
anced evaluation of Fermat’s work on Apollonius’ Plane Loci, emphasiz-
ing its classical geometric style, and contrasting it with van Schooten’s:
Fermat’s demonstration of Locus II-5 is presented in the
classical geometrical style of the day, though his concep-
tion was already algebraic; [van] Schooten’s is a pure ex-
ercise of analytic geometry. (Recasens [76], 1994, p. 315)
What is the source of Fried’s facile dismissal of Fermat’s historical
scholarship? While it is difficult to be certain, a clue is found in the
attitude of his mentor Unguru who wrote:
[Fermat] took the Greek problems away from their in-
digenous territory into new and foreign lands. Interest-
ingly (and again, I think, quite typically), Fermat did
not see in his novel and revolutionary methods strate-
gies intrinsically alien to Greek mathematics, thus con-
tributing to the creation of the pervading and pernicious
myth that there are not indeed any substantive differ-
ences between the geometrical works of the Greeks and
the algebraic treatment of Greek mathematics by post-
Vie`tan mathematicians. (Unguru [85], 1976, p. 775)
Unguru describes Fermat’s reading of Apollonius as contributing to a
“pernicious myth,” and Fermat’s reliance on Vieta’s theory of equations
as “alien” to Greek mathematics; Fried apparently follows suit.
By page 12, Fried takes on a group he labels “mathematician-histo-
rians” whose fault is their interest in historical continuity:
The mathematics of the past is still understood by them
as continuous with present mathematics. (Fried [47,
p. 12])
Again, adherence to the continuity view is cast without argument as a
fault (see Section 2.1). Yet positing discontinuity as a working hypoth-
esis can make scholars myopic to important aspects of the historical
development of mathematics, and have a chilling effect on attempts to
explain why certain mathematical developments happened (the Fraser–
Schroter definition of the task of a historian); see Section 3 for some
examples.
2.3. Axiom 2: Tabula rasa. Unguru’s opposite number Weil makes
a predictable appearance in (Fried [47], 2018) on page 14, under the
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label privileged observer. The label also covers Zeuthen and van der
Waerden. The fault for this particular label is the desire to take ad-
vantage of “their mathematical ideas . . . to piece together the past”
(ibid.). Fried’s posture on Weil brings us to the next axiom of Friedian
historiographic ideology:
Axiom 2 (tabula rasa). It is both possible and proper
for historians to refrain from using modern mathemati-
cal ideas.
By page 16 we learn what authentic historians of mathematics do: they
take as their working assumption, a kind of null-hypothesis,
that there is a discontinuity between mathematical thought
of the past and that of the present. [47, p. 16] (emphasis
added)
This formulation of Fried’s discontinuity axiom (see Section 2.1) has
the advantage of being explicitly cast as a hypothesis. Yet nothing
about Fried’s tone here suggests any intention of actually exploring
the validity of such a hypothesis. A related objection to Fried’s posture
was raised by Bl˚asjo¨ and Hogendijk ([17], 2018, p. 775), who argue that
ancient treatises may contain meanings and intentions that go beyond
the surface text, based on a study of Ptolemy’s Almagest. We will
analyze Fried’s Axiom 2 in Section 3.
2.4. Axiom 3: Uprooting the Platonist deviation. The follow-
ing additional axiom is discernible in the writings of Unguru and his
students.
Axiom 3 (Mathematicians as Platonists) Mathe-
maticians interested in history are predominantly Pla-
tonists; furthermore, their beliefs (e.g., that mathemat-
ics is eternally true and unchanging) interfere with their
functioning as competent historians.
Mathematicians interested in history are repeatedly described as Pla-
tonists (see Figure 1) in the writings of Fried, Rowe, and Unguru.
Thus, one finds the following comments (emphasis on “Platonic” added
throughout):
(Pl 1) “[M]athematically minded historians . . . assume tacitly or ex-
plicitly that mathematical entities reside in the world of Pla-
tonic ideas where they wait patiently to be discovered by the ge-
nius of the working mathematician” (Unguru–Rowe [88], 1981,
p. 3, quoting [86]). Unguru and Rowe go on at length (pages 5
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Figure 1. Mathematical Platonism. A humorous illustra-
tion from the book Homotopic Topology. The writing on
the wall reads (in Russian): “Homotopy groups of spheres.”
Created by Professor A. T. Fomenko, academician, Moscow
State University. Reproduced with permission of the author.
through 10) to attack van der Waerden’s interpretation of cunei-
form tablet BM 13901.1
1For a rebuttal of the Unguru–Rowe critique see Bl˚asjo¨ ([15], 2016, Section 3.4).
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(Pl 2) “It has been argued that most contemporary historians of math-
ematics are Platonists in their approach. They look in the past
of mathematics for the eternally true, the unchanging, the con-
stant” (Unguru–Rowe [89], 1982, p. 47). The problem with such
an approach is diagnosed as follows: “If nothing changes there
is no history” (op. cit., p. 48).
(Pl 3) “[T]he methodology embodied in ‘geometric algebra’ . . . is the
outgrowth of a Platonic metaphysics that sees mathematical
ideas as disembodied beings, pure and untainted by any id-
iosyncratic features” (Fried–Unguru [48], 2001, p. 37).
(Pl 4) “That Apollonius was a skilled geometrical algebraist is clearly
the considerate opinion of Zeuthen. It is an opinion based ex-
clusively on a Platonic philosophy of mathematics, according to
which one and the same mathematical idea remains the same
irrespective of its specific manifestations” (Fried–Unguru [48],
2001, pp. 47–48; emphasis added).
(Pl 5) “There is one mathematics, from its pre-historical beginnings
to the end of time, irrespective of its changing appearances over
the centuries. This mathematics grows by accumulation and by
a sharpening of its standards of rigor, while, its rational, ideal,
Platonic Kernel, remaining unaffected by the historical changes
mathematics undergoes, enjoys, as Hardy put it, immortality.
In short, proven mathematical claims remain proven forever,
no matter what the changes are that mathematics is under-
going. And since it is always possible to present past mathe-
matics in modern garb, ancient mathematical accomplishments
can be easily made to look modern and, therewith seamlessly
integrated into the growing body of mathematical knowledge”
(Unguru [87], 2018, pp. 19–20).
(Pl 6) “The Platonic outlook embodied in Weil’s statements, accord-
ing to which (1) mathematical entities reside in the world of
Platonic ideas and (2) mathematical equivalence is tantamount
to historical equivalence, is inimical to history” (Unguru [87],
2018, p. 29).
What is comical about this string of attempts to pin a Platonist label
on scholars is the contrast between the extreme care Unguru and his
students advocate in working with primary documents and sourcing
every historical claim, on the one hand, and the absence of such sources
when it comes to criticizing scholars they disagree with, on the other.
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This is not to say that mathematicians interested in history are never
Platonists. Thus, in a recent volume by Dani–Papadopoulos, one learns
that
[T]hinkers in colonial towns in Asia Minor, Magna Grae-
cia, and mainland Greece, cultivated a love for system-
atizing phenomena on a rational basis . . . They appre-
ciated purity, universality, a certainty and an elegance
of mathematics, the characteristics that all other forms
of knowledge do not possess. ([34], 2019, p. 216)
While such attitudes do exist, it remains that claiming your oppo-
nents are Platonists without providing evidence is no more convincing
than claiming that Greek geometry had an algebraic foundation with-
out providing evidence, a fault Unguru and others impute to their
opponents. Without engaging in wild-eyed accusations of Platonism
against scholars he disagreed with, Grattan-Guinness [52] was able to
enunciate a dignified objection to geometric algebra (for a response see
Bl˚asjo¨ [15, Section 3.10]).
With regard to Axiom 3, it is worth noting that the broader the
spectrum of the culprits named by Unguru, the less credible his charge
of Platonism becomes. Consider, for example, the claim in (Pl 4) above
that Zeuthen’s opinion is “based exclusively on a Platonic philosophy
of mathematics” (emphasis added). Unguru attacks Heiberg in [84,
p. 107] with similar vehemence. But how credible would be a claim
that the historiographic philosophy of the philologist Johan Ludvig
Heiberg (of the Archimedes Palimpsest fame) is due to mathematical
Platonist beliefs, especially if no evidence is provided?
2.5. Corry’s universals. Axiomatizing tendencies similar to those of
Fried, Rowe, and Unguru manifest themselves in the writing by Un-
guru’s student Corry, as well.
Engagement with Platonism and its discontents appears to be a con-
stant preoccupation in Corry’s work. He alludes to Platonism by using
terms as varied as “eternal truth,” “essence of algebra,” and “universal
properties.” Thus, in 1997 he writes:
[Bourbaki] were extending in an unprecedented way the
domain of validity of the belief in the eternal character
of mathematical truths, from the body to the images of
mathematical knowledge. (Corry [30], 1997, p. 253)
In 2004 (originally published in 1996) he writes:
. . . a common difficulty that has been manifest . . . is
the attempt to define, by either of the sides involved,
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the “essence” of algebraic thinking throughout history.
Such an attempt appears, from the perspective offered
by the views advanced throughout the present book, as
misconceived. (Corry [31], 2004, p. 396).
In 2013 we find:
. . . the question about the “essence of algebra” as an
ahistorical category seems to me an ill-posed and unin-
teresting one. (Corry [33], 2013, p. 639)
In 2007, Corry imputes to mathematicians a quest for “universal prop-
erties” at the expense of historical authenticity. He appears to endorse
Unguru’s view of mathematicians as Platonists when he writes:
[I]n analyzing mathematics of the past mathematicians
often look for underlying mathematical concepts, regu-
larities or affinities in order to conclude about histor-
ical connection. Mathematical affinity necessarily fol-
lows from universal properties of the entities involved
and this has often been taken to suggest a certain his-
torical scenario that ‘might be’. But, Unguru warns us,
one should be very careful not to allow such mathemat-
ical arguments led [sic] us to mistake historical truth
(i.e., the ‘thing that has been’) with what is no more
than mathematically possible scenarios (i.e., the ‘thing
that might be’). The former can only be found by di-
rect historical evidence. (Corry [32], 2007; emphasis on
“has” and “might” in the original; emphasis on “univer-
sal properties” and “historical evidence” added)
Granted one needs direct historical evidence, as per Corry. However,
where is the evidence that instead of looking for evidence, mathemati-
cians interested in history look for universal properties? Such a view
of mathematicians who are historians is postulated axiomatically by
Corry, similarly to Fried, Rowe, and Unguru. Corry goes on to claim
that
[Unguru’s 1975] work immediately attracted furious re-
actions, above all from three prominent mathematicians
interested in the history of mathematics: Andre´ Weil,
Bartel L. van der Waerden, and Hans Freudenthal. (ibid.;
emphasis added)
Corry’s remark is specifically characterized by the attitude of looking
for “the thing that might be” rather than the “thing that has been”,
a distinction he mentions in the passage quoted above. Namely, once
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Corry postulates a universal -seeking attitude on the part of Weil, van
der Waerden, and Freudental, it then naturally follows, for Corry, that
they would necessarily react “furiously” to Unguru’s work. Corry does
present evidence of presentist attitudes in historiography in connection
with interpreting the Pythagorean discovery of the incommensurability
of the diagonal and the side of the square. However, Corry presents evi-
dence of such attitudes not in the writings of Weil, van der Waerden, or
Freudental, but rather those of. . . Carl Boyer ([22], 1968, p. 80).2 For a
discussion of the shortcomings of Boyer’s historiographic approach see
Section 3.6. Note that Weil is just as sceptical as Corry about claims
being made on behalf of the Pythagoreans; see (Weil [94], 1984, pp. 5,
8). We will analyze Corry’s problematic criticisms of van der Waerden,
Freudenthal, and Weil respectively in Sections 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8.
2.6. van der Waerden on Diophantus and Arabic algebra. Con-
trary to the claims emanating from the Unguru school, some of Un-
guru’s opponents specifically denied being Platonist. Thus, van der
Waerden wrote:
I am simply not a Platonist. For me mathematics is not
a contemplation of essences but intellectual construc-
tion. (van der Waerden as translated in Schappacher
[78], 2007, p. 245)
It is instructive to contrast Unguru’s attitude toward van der Waerden
with Szabo´’s. Szabo´’s book ([82], 1978) deals with van der Waerden at
length, but there is no trace there of any allegation of Platonist devia-
tion. On the contrary, Szabo´’s book relies on van der Waerden’s histor-
ical scholarship, as noted also by Folkerts ([42], 1969). The book does
criticize van der Waerden for what Szabo´ claims to be an over-reliance
on translations. Szabo´ discusses this issue in detail in the context of
an analysis of the meaning of the Greek term δυ´ναµις (dynamis),3 as
mentioned by Folkerts.
2In [32], Corry criticizes attempts to deduce a purely historical claim merely from
“underlying mathematical affinity.” Corry provides the following example: “It is
thus inferred that the Pythagoreans proved the incommensurability of the diagonal
of a square with its side exactly as we nowadays prove that
√
2 is an irrational
number.” Corry’s example is followed by a reference to (Boyer [22], 1968, p. 80).
On that page, Boyer wrote: “A third explanation [of the expulsion of Hippasus
from the Pythagorean brotherhood] holds that the expulsion was coupled with the
disclosure of a mathematical discovery of devastating significance for Pythagorean
philosophy—the existence of incommensurable magnitudes.”
3At the risk of committing precisely the type of inaccuracy criticized by Szabo´,
one could translate dynamis roughly as “the squaring operation”.
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In reality, van der Waerden’s 1976 article contains no sign of the
“fury” claimed by Corry (see Section 2.5). Perhaps the most agitated
passage there is van der Waerden’s rebuttal of a spurious claim by
Unguru (which is echoed thirty years later by Corry in [32]):
We (Zeuthen and his followers) feel that the Greeks
started with algebraic problems and translated them
into geometric language. Unguru thinks that we argued
like this: We found that the theorems of Euclid II can
be translated into modern algebraic formalism, and that
they are easier to understand if thus translated, and this
we took as ‘the proof that this is what the ancient math-
ematician had in mind’. Of course, this is nonsense. We
are not so weak in logical thinking! The fact that a the-
orem can be translated into another notation does not
prove a thing about what the author of the theorem had
in mind. (van der Waerden [90], 1976, p. 203)
What one does find in van der Waerden’s article is a specific rebuttal
of Corry’s claim concerning an alleged search for universal properties
(see Section 2.5). Here van der Waerden was responding to Unguru,
who had claimed that algebraic thinking involves
Freedom from any ontological questions and commit-
ments and, connected with this, abstractness rather than
intuitiveness. (Unguru [84], 1975, p. 77)
Van der Waerden responded by rejecting Unguru’s characterisation of
the algebra involved in his work on Greek mathematics, and pointed
out that what he is referring to is
algebra in the sense of Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯, or in the sense
of Cardano’s ‘Ars magna’, or in the sense of our school
algebra. (van der Waerden [90], 1976, p. 199)
Thus, van der Waerden specifically endorsed a similarity between Ara-
bic premodern algebra and Greek mathematics, and analyzed Diophan-
tus specifically in [90, p. 210].
A similarity between Arabic premodern algebra and the work of Dio-
phantus is also emphasized by Christianidis ([26], 2018). The continu-
ation of the passage from van der Waerden is more problematic from
the point of view of [26]. Here he wrote:
Algebra, then, is: the art of handling algebraic expres-
sions like (a+b)2 and of solving equations like x2 + ax = b.
(van der Waerden [90], 1976, p. 199)
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The viewpoint expressed here is at odds with the emphasis in [26] on the
fact that premodern algebra did not deal with equations, polynomials
were not sums but rather aggregates, and the operations stipulated
in the problem were performed before the statement of the equation.
However, apart from these important points, van der Waerden’s notion
of Greek mathematics as close to Arabic premodern algebra is kindred
to the viewpoint elaborated in [26] and [27].4
The article [26] elaborates a distinction between modern algebra and
premodern algebra. The latter term covers both Arabic sources and
Diophantus. The position presented in [26] is clearly at odds with
Unguru, who wrote:
With Vie`te algebra becomes the very language of math-
ematics; in Diophantus’ Arithmetica, on the other hand,
we possess merely a refined auxiliary tool for the solu-
tion of arithmetical problems . . . (Unguru [84], 1975,
p. 111, note 138)
Regardless of how close the positions of van der Waerden and [26]
can be considered to be, there is no mention of universal properties in
van der Waerden’s work on Greek mathematics. The universals appear
to be all Corry’s, not van der Waerden’s.
2.7. Corry’s shift on Freudenthal. Similarly instructive is Corry’s–
as we argue–variable position on Freudenthal in connection with Pla-
tonism and Bourbaki. The standard story on Bourbaki is the one of
mathematical Formalism and structures. In Corry’s view, there is some
question concerning how different this is, in Bourbaki’s case, from Pla-
tonism. Here is what Corry wrote in his book in 1996:
The above-described mixture [in Bourbaki] of a declared
formalist philosophy with a heavy dose of actual Pla-
tonic belief is illuminating in this regard. The formal-
ist imperative, derived from that ambiguous position,
provides the necessary background against which Bour-
baki’s drive to define the formal concept of structure and
to develop some immediate results connected with it can
be conceived. The Platonic stand, on the other hand,
which reflects Bourbaki’s true working habits and be-
liefs, has led the very members of the group to consider
4It would be more difficult to bridge the gap between the positions of Weil and
[26], since Weil claims that “there is much, in Diophantus and in Vie`te’s Zetetica,
which in our view pertains to algebraic geometry” [94, p. 25], whereas [26] specif-
ically distances itself from attempts to interpret Diophantus in terms of algebraic
geometry.
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this kind of conventional, formal effort as superfluous.
(Corry [29], 1996, p. 311; emphasis on “structure” in
the original; emphasis on “actual Platonic belief” and
“Platonic” added)
On page 336 in the same book, Corry quotes Freudenthal’s biting crit-
icism of Piaget’s reliance on Bourbaki and their concept of structure
as an organizing principle:
The most spectacular example of organizing mathemat-
ics is, of course, Bourbaki. How convincing this or-
ganization of mathematics is! So convincing that Pi-
aget could rediscover Bourbaki’s system in developmen-
tal psychology. . . . Piaget is not a mathematician, so
he could not know how unreliable mathematical system
builders are. (Freudenthal as quoted in Corry [29], 1996,
p. 336).
The same passage is quoted in the earlier article (Corry [28], 1992,
p. 341).
The index in Corry’s book on Bourbaki contains an ample supply
of entries containing the term universal, including universal constructs
and universal problems, a constant preoccupation of Bourbaki’s which
can also be seen as a function of their Platonist background philoso-
phy in the sense Corry outlined in [29, p. 311], where Corry speaks of
Bourbaki’s “actual Platonic belief.”
There is a clear contrast, in Corry’s mind, between Platonism, uni-
versals, Bourbaki, and Piaget, on one side of the debate, and Freuden-
thal with his clear opposition to both Bourbaki and Piaget, on the
other. Freudenthal’s opposition tends to undercut the idea of Freuden-
thal as Platonist, which in any case is at odds with Freudenthal’s prag-
matic position on mathematics education; see e.g., La Bastide ([63],
2015).
On the other hand, Corry’s article ([32], 2007) includes Freudenthal
on the list of the Platonist mathematical culprits (van der Waerden,
Freudenthal, Weil) that has been made standard by Unguru. According
to Corry 2007, these scholars are in search of universal properties ; see
Section 2.5. This fits with Unguru’s take on Freudenthal, but is at odds
with what Corry himself wrote about Freudenthal a decade earlier, as
documented above.
In fact, Freudenthal specifically sought to distance himself from Pla-
tonism in ([46], 1978, p. 7). Freudenthal’s interest in Intuitionism is
discussed in [63, p. 42]. He published at least two papers in the area:
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[43] and [44]. This interest similarly points away from Platonism, con-
trary to Corry’s claim.
2.8. Weil: internalist or externalist? Corry attacks both Weil and
Bourbaki as Platonist, and dismisses Bourbaki’s volume on the history
of mathematics [20] as “royal-road-to-me” historiography, in (Corry
[32], 2007). Paumier and Aubin make a more specific claim against
the Bourbaki volume generally and Weil’s historiography in particular.
Namely, they refer to the volume as “internalist history of concepts”
[75, p. 185], and imply that the same criticism applies to Weil’s histori-
ography, as well. In a related vein, Kutrova´tz casts Unguru and Szabo´
as externalists and Weil as internalist and Platonist in [62].
To evaluate such criticisms of Weil, the Bourbaki volume is of limited
utility since it was of joint authorship. We will examine instead Weil’s
own book Number theory. An approach through history. From Ham-
murapi to Legendre ([94], 1984). Does the internalist criticism apply
here?
To answer the question, we would need to agree first on the mean-
ing of internalist and externalist. If we posit that historical work is
externalist if it is written by Unguru, his disciples, and their cronies,
then there is little hope for Weil. There is perhaps hope with a less
partisan definition, such as “historiography that takes into account the
contingent details of the historical period and its social context, etc.”
It is clear that historical and social factors are important. For instance,
one obtains a distorted picture of the mathematics of Gregory, Fermat,
and Leibniz if one disregards the fierce religious debates of the 17th
century (see references listed in Section 3.1).
Now it so happens that Weil’s book [94] does contain detailed dis-
cussions of the historical context. Weil’s book is not without its short-
comings. For instance, when Weil mentions that Bachet “extracted
from Diophantus the conjecture that every integer is a sum of four
squares, and asked for a proof” [94, p. 34], the reader may well feel dis-
appointed by the ambiguity of the verb “extracted” and the absence
of references. However, what interests us here is the validity or other-
wise of the contention (implicit in Unguru and Corry and explicit in
Paumier–Aubin and Kutrova´tz) that Weil was internalist. Was Weil
internalist as charged?
Weil mentions, for instance, that Euler was first motivated to look
at the problem of Fermat primes 22
n
+ 1 by his correspondent Gold-
bach [94, p. 172]. To give another example, Weil mentions that Fermat
learned Vieta’s symbolic algebra through his visits to d’Espagnet’s pri-
vate library in Bordeaux in the 1620s [94, p. 39]. Such visits took
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place many years before Vieta’s works were published in 1646 by van
Schooten. In particular, the Fermat–d’Espagnet contact was instru-
mental in Fermat’s formulation of his method of adequality (see Sec-
tion 3.2) relying as it did on Vieta’s symbolic algebra. Such examples
undermine the Paumier–Aubin claims, such as the following:
(1) the charge of “an ‘internalist history of concepts’ which has only
little to say about the way in which mathematics emerged from
the interaction of groups of people in specific circumstances”
[75, p. 187];
(2) the claim that “The focus on ideas erased much of the social
dynamics at play in the historical development of mathematics”
[75, p. 204].
As we showed, Weil does take the interactions and the dynamics into
account.
3. Some case studies
We identified Fried’s tabula rasa axiom in Section 2.3, and will an-
alyze it in more detail in this section. It seems that while the axiom
may be appropriate in certain cases, it is an assumption that needs to
be argued rather than merely postulated. Such a need to argue the
case applies to the very possibility itself of a “tabula rasa” attitude in
the first place:
(TR1) Can historians of mathematics truly view the past without the
lens of modern mathematics?
(TR2) Have historians been successful in such an endeavor?
Whereas it may be difficult to rule out the theoretical possibility of
an affirmative answer to (TR1), a number of recent studies suggest that
in practice, the answer to (TR2) is often negative, as we will discuss in
Section 3.1.
3.1. History of analysis. Some historians of 17th through 19th cen-
tury mathematical analysis, while claiming to reject insights provided
by modern mathematics in their interpretations, turn out themselves
to be privileged observers in Fried’s sense (see Section 2.3) though still
in denial. Namely, they operate within a conceptual scheme dominated
by the mathematical framework developed by Weierstrass at the end
of the 19th century, as argued in recent studies in the following cases:
• Fermat, in Katz et al. ([61], 2013) and Bair et al. ([8], 2018);
• Gregory, in Bascelli et al. ([12], 2018);
• Leibniz, in Sherry–Katz ([79], 2014), Bascelli et al. ([10], 2016),
Bl˚asjo¨ ([16], 2017), and Bair et al. ([2], 2018);
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• Euler, in Kanovei et al. ([60], 2015) and Bair et al. ([4], 2017);
• Cauchy, in Bair et al. ([3], 2017); Bascelli et al. ([11], 2018); and
Bair et al. ([5], 2019 and [6], 2020).
The pattern that emerges from these studies is that some modern histo-
rians, limited in their knowledge of modern mathematics, tend to take
a narrow view, that in some cases borders on naivete, of the work of the
great mathematical pioneers of the 17–19th centuries (see Sections 3.7
and 3.8 for examples).
The Fermat historian Mahoney is a case in point. Weil pointed
out numerous historical, philological, and mathematical errors in Ma-
honey’s work on Fermat; see [92]. Yet in the Friedian scheme of things,
Weil is neatly shelved away on the privileged observer shelf, whereas
Mahoney’s work, breezy journalese and all, is blithely assumed to re-
side in that rarefied stratum called authentic history of mathematics,
and relied upon to pass judgments on the value of the historical work
by the great Pierre de Fermat (see Section 2.1).
3.2. Fermat’s adequality. Fermat used the method of adequality to
find maxima and minima, tangents, and solve other problems.
To illustrate Fermat’s method, consider the first example appearing
in his Oeuvres [37, p. 134]. Fermat considers a segment of length B,
splits it into variable segments of length A and B − A, and seeks to
maximize the product A(B − A), i.e.,
BA−A2. (3.1)
Next, Fermat replaces A by A+E (and B−A by B−A−E). There is
a controversy in the literature as to exact nature of Fermat’s E, but for
the purposes of following the mathematics it may be helpful to think
of E as small. Fermat goes on to expand the corresponding product as
follows:
BA− A2 +BE − 2AE −E2. (3.2)
In order to compare the expressions (3.1) and (3.2), Fermat removes the
terms independent of E from both expressions, and forms the relation
BE pq 2AE + E
2, (3.3)
also referred to as adequality. In the original, the term adæquabitur
appears where we used the symbol pq .
5 We will present the final part
of Fermat’s solution in Section 3.4.
5A symbol similar to pq was used several decades later by Leibniz, interchange-
ably with =, to denote a relation of generalized equality.
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3.3. van Maanen’s summary. Fermat’s method is described as fol-
lows by van Maanen:6
Fermat seems to have based his method for finding a
maximum or minimum for a certain algebraic expres-
sion I(x) on a double root argument, but in practice
the algorithm was used in the following slightly differ-
ent form. Fermat argued that if the extreme value is
attained at xM , I(x) is constant in an infinitely small
neighborhood7 of xM . Thus, if E is very small, xM sat-
isfies the equation I(x+ E) = I(x). [91, p. 52]
Fermat never actually formed an algebraic relation (using Vieta’s sym-
bolic algebra) of adæquabitur between the expressions I(x+E) and I(x).
The kind of relation he did form is illustrated in formula (3.3) in Sec-
tion 3.2. Van Maanen provides the following additional explanations:
This expression states that close to the extreme value,8
lines parallel to the x-axis will intersect the graph of I
in two different points, but the extreme is characterised
by the fact that these . . . parallels turn into the tan-
gent [line] and the points of intersections reduce to one
point which counts twice. The common terms in x are
removed from the equation I(x+E) = I(x) and the re-
sulting equation divided by E. Any remaining terms are
deleted, and xM is solved from the resulting equation.
(ibid.)
While the summary by van Maanen does not mention the possibility of
dividing by E2, it is important to note that in Fermat’s descriptions of
the method, Fermat does envision the possibility of dividing by higher
powers of E in the process of obtaining the extremum.
3.4. Squaring both sides. In the example presented in Section 3.2,
the term BE and the sum 2AE + E2 originally both appeared in the
expression (3.2), but appear on different sides in relation (3.3) (all with
positive sign). The remainder of Fermat’s algorithm is more familiar
to the modern reader: one divides both sides by E to produce the
relation B pq 2A + E, and discards the summand E to obtain the
solution A = B
2
.
6In place of Fermat’s E, van Maanen uses a lower-case e. The pieces of nota-
tion I(x), xM , and = are van Maanen’s.
7Describing Fermat’s method in terms of the infinitely small is not entirely un-
controversial and is subject to debate; for details see Bair et al. ([8], 2018).
8We added the comma for clarity.
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For future reference, we note that a relation of type (3.3) can be
squared to produce a relation of type (BE)2 pq (2AE + E
2)2. In this
particular example, the relation need not be squared. However, in an
example involving square roots one needs to square both sides at a
certain stage to eliminate the radicals; see Section 3.5. Meanwhile,
once one passes to the difference I(x+E)− I(x) (to use van Maanen’s
notation), such an opportunity is lost.
Fermat never performed the step of carrying all the terms to the left-
hand side of the relation so as to form the difference I(x+E)−I(x);9 nor
did Fermat ever form the quotient I(x+E)−I(x)
E
familiar to the modern
reader. In Section 3.5 we will compare the treatment of this aspect of
Fermat’s method by a historian and a mathematician.
3.5. Experiencing E2. The perspective of Unguruan polarity can
lead historians to devote insufficient attention to the actual mathemat-
ical details and ultimately to historical error. Thus, Mahoney claimed
the following:
In fact, in the problems Fermat worked out, the proviso
of repeated division by y [i.e., E] was unnecessary. But,
thinking in terms of the theory of equations, Fermat
could imagine, even if he had not experienced, cases in
which the adequated expressions contained nothing less
than higher powers of y. (Mahoney [68], 1994, p. 165;
emphasis added)
Mahoney assumed that Fermat “had not experienced” cases where divi-
sion by E2 was necessary. Meanwhile, Giusti analyzes an example “ex-
perienced” by Fermat which involves radicals, and which indeed leads
to division by E2. The example (Fermat [37], p. 153) involves finding
the maximum of the expression A+
√
BA− A2 (here B is fixed). In the
process of solution, a suitable relation of adequality, as in formula (3.3),
indeed needs to be squared (see Section 3.4). Giusti concludes:
Ce qui nous inte´resse dans ce cas est qu’il donne en ex-
emple une ade´galite´ ou` les termes d’ordre le plus bas
sont en E2. Comme on sait, dans l’e´nonciation de sa
re`gle Fermat parlait de division par E ou par une puis-
sance de E . . . Plusieurs commentateurs ont soutenu
. . . que Fermat avait commis ici une erreur . . . On
doit donc penser que dans un premier moment Fermat
avait traite´ les quantite´s contenant des racines avec la
9Fermat historian Breger did in ([24], 2013, p. 27); for details see Bair et al. ([8],
2018, Section 2.6, p. 573).
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me´thode usuelle, qui conduisait parfois a` la disparition
des termes en E, et qui ait tenu compte de cette e´vent-
ualite´ dans l’e´nonciation de la re`gle ge´ne´rale. (Giusti
[51], 2009, Section 6, pp. 75–76; emphasis added).
What Giusti is pointing out is that in this particular application of
adequality in a case involving radicals, division by E2 (and not merely
by E) is required. Thus, the error is Mahoney’s, not Fermat’s.
A first-rate analyst and differential geometer, Giusti was able to ap-
preciate the discontinuity between Fermat’s method of adequality, on
the one hand, and the modern I(x+E)−I(x)
E
perspective, on the other,
better than many a Fermat historian. More generally, a scholar’s work
should be evaluated on the basis of its own merits rather than which
class he primarily belongs to, be it historian, mathematician, or philol-
ogist.
Appreciating discontinuity is not the prerogative of Unguru’s adepts,
contrary to strawman accounts found in Unguru ([87], 2018) and Guic-
ciardini ([54], 2018). The portrait of a mathematician’s view of his
discipline dominated by mathematical Platonism as found in Unguru
and his students (as detailed in Section 2.4) as well as Guicciardini
is similarly a strawman caricature, as when Guicciardini elaborates on
“the perfect embodiment of the immutable laws of mathematics written
in the sky for eternity” [54, p. 148] and claims that “[t]he mathemati-
cian’s world is the world of Urania” (op. cit., p. 150).
3.6. Why certain developments happened: Euler to Cauchy.
Analyzing the differences between 18th and 19th century analysis,
Fraser and Schroter observe:
The decline of [Euler’s] formalism stemmed mainly from
its limitations as a means of generating useful results.
Moreover, as methods began to change, an awareness of
formalism’s apparent difficulties and even contradictions
lent momentum to efforts to rein it in. (Fraser–Schroter
[40], 2020, Section 3.3)
Note that Fraser and Schroter are analyzing Euler’s own work itself
here, rather than its reception by Cauchy. Fraser and Schroter con-
tinue:
Euler had been confident that the “out-there” objectiv-
ity of algebra secured the generality of his formal tech-
niques, but Cauchy demanded that generality be found
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within mathematical methods themselves. In his [text-
book] Cours d’analyse of 1821 Cauchy rejected formal-
ism in favour of a fully quantitative analysis. (ibid.)
Fraser and Schroter feel that the limitations and difficulties of Eu-
ler’s variety of algebraic formalism can be fruitfully analyzed from
the standpoint of considerably later developments, notably Cauchy’s
“quantitative analysis.” In their view, it is possible to comment on
the shortcomings of Euler’s algebraic formalism and the reasons for
this particular development from Euler to Cauchy without running the
risk of anachronism. Meawhile, it is clear that the Fraser–Schroter ap-
proach may run afoul of both the discontinuity axiom (see Section 2.1)
and the tabula rasa axiom (see Section 2.3).
The issue of anachronism was perceptively analyzed by Ian Hacking
([55], 2014) in terms of the distinction between the butterfly model and
the Latin model for the development of a scientific discipline. Hack-
ing contrasts a model of a deterministic (genetically determined) bio-
logical development of animals like butterflies (the egg–larva–cocoon–
butterfly sequence), with a model of a contingent historical evolution of
languages like Latin. Emphasizing determinism over contingency can
easily lead to anachronism; for more details see Bair et al. ([5], 2019).
Similarly to Hacking, Fraser notes the danger for a historian in the
adoption of a model based on an analogy with the pre-determined
evolution of a biological organism. In his review of Boyer’s book The
concepts of the calculus, Fraser comments on the risks of anachronism:
[Boyer’s] focus on the development of concepts through
time may reflect as well an embrace of the metaphor of
a plant or animal organism. The concept undergoes a
progressive development, moving in a directed and pre-
determined way from its origins to an adult and com-
pleted form. . . . The possibility of introducing anachro-
nisms is almost inevitable in such an approach, and to a
certain degree this is true of Boyer’s book. (Fraser [38],
2019, p. 18)
Fraser specifically singles out for criticism Boyer’s teleological view of
mathematical analysis as inexorably progressing toward the ultimate
Epsilontik achievement:
[Boyer] seemed to view the eighteenth-century work as
exploratory or approximative as the subject moved in-
exorably in the direction of the arithmetical limit-based
approach of Augustin-Louis Cauchy and Karl Weier-
strass. (op. cit., p. 19)
MATHEMATICAL CONQUEROR, UNGURU POLARITY, TASK OF HISTORY23
We will report on two additional cases of such teleological thinking in
the historiography of mathematics in Sections 3.7 and 3.8.
3.7. Leibnizian infinitesimals. Boyer-style, Epsilontik -oriented tele-
ological readings of the history of analysis (see Section 3.6) are common
in the literature. Thus, Ishiguro interprets Leibnizian infinitesimals as
follows:
It seems that when we make reference to infinitesimals
in a proposition, we are not designating a fixed mag-
nitude incomparably smaller than our ordinary magni-
tudes. Leibniz is saying that whatever small magnitude
an opponent may present, one can assert the existence of
a smaller magnitude. In other words, we can paraphrase
the proposition with a universal proposition with an em-
bedded existential claim. (Ishiguro [59], 1990, p. 87)
What is posited here is the contention that when Leibniz wrote that
his incomparable (or inassignable) dx, or ǫ, was smaller than every
given (assignable) quantity Q, what he really meant was an alternating-
quantifier clause (universal quantifier ∀ followed by an existential one ∃)
to the effect that for each given Q > 0 there exists an ǫ > 0 such
that ǫ < Q. Such a logical sleight of hand goes under the name of
the syncategorematic interpretation. Here the author is interpreting
Leibniz as thinking like Weierstrass (see also Section 3.10). For details
see Bascelli et al. ([10], 2016) and Bair et al. ([2], 2018).
3.8. Cauchyan infinitesimals. In a similar vein, Siegmund-Schultze
views Cauchy’s use of infinitesimals as a step backward :
There has been . . . an intense historical discussion in
the last four decades or so how to interpret certain ap-
parent remnants of the past or – as compared to J. L.
Lagrange’s (1736–1813) rigorous ‘Algebraic Analysis’ –
even steps backwards in Cauchy’s book, particularly his
use of infinitesimals . . . (Siegmund-Schultze [80], 2009;
emphasis added)
Siegmund-Schultze’s reader will have little trouble reconstructing ex-
actly which direction a step forward may have been in. Grabiner sim-
ilarly reads Cauchy as thinking like Weierstrass; for details see Bair et
al. ([5], 2019).
3.9. History, heritage, or escapade? Significantly, in his essay Fried
fails to mention the seminal scholarship of Reviel Netz on ancient Greek
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mathematics (see e.g., [72], [73], [74]). Would, for example, Netz’s de-
tection of traces of infinitesimals in the work of Archimedes be listed
under the label of history, heritage, or “escapade” (to quote Fried)?
Would an argument to the effect that the procedures (see Section 3.10)
of the Leibnizian calculus find better proxies in modern infinitesimal
frameworks than in late 19th century Weierstrassian ones, rank as his-
tory, heritage, or escapade? Would an argument to the effect that
Cauchy’s definition of continuity via infinitesimals finds better proxies
in modern infinitesimal frameworks than in late 19th century Weier-
strassian ones, rank as history, heritage, or escapade? Unfortunately,
there is little in Fried’s essay that would allow one to explore such
questions.
3.10. Procedures vs ontology. The procedures/ontology distinction
elaborated in B laszczyk et al. ([19], 2018) can be thought of as a
refinement of Grattan-Guinness’ history/heritage distinction. Con-
sider for instance Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus. Without the pro-
cedure/ontology distinction, interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimals in
terms of modern infinitesimals will be predictably criticized for utiliz-
ing history as heritage. What some historians do not appreciate suffi-
ciently is that, in an ontological sense, interpreting Leibniz in Weier-
strassian terms is just as much heritage. Surely talking about Leibniz
in terms of ultrafilters10 is not writing history; however, analyzing Leib-
nizian procedures in terms of those of Robinson’s procedures is better
history than a lot of what is written on Leibniz by received histori-
ans and philosophers (who have pursued a syncategorematic reading
of Leibnizian infinitesimals; see Section 3.7), such as Ishiguro, Arthur,
Rabouin, and others; for details see Bair et al. ([2], 2018).
We summarize some of the arguments involved. 1. Leibniz made
it clear on more than one occasion that his infinitesimals violate Eu-
clid Definition V.5 (Euclid V.4 in modern editions), which is a version
of what is known today as the Archimedean axiom; see e.g., (Leibniz
[64], 1695, p. 322). In this sense, the procedures in Leibniz are closer to
those in Robinson than those in Weierstrass. 2. If one follows Unguru’s
strictures and Fried’s tabula rasa, one can’t exploit any modern frame-
work to interpret Leibniz; however, in practice the syncategorematic
society interpret Leibniz in Weierstrassian terms, so the Unguruan ob-
jection is a moot point as far as the current debate over the Leibnizian
calculus is concerned. 3.While modern foundations of mathematics
were clearly not known to Leibniz, it is worth pointing out that this
applies both to the set-theoretic foundational ontology of the classical
10See e.g., Fletcher et al. [41] for a technical explanation.
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Archimedean track, and to Robinson’s non-Archimedean track. But
as far as Leibniz’s procedures are concerned, they find closer proxies in
Robinson’s framework than in a Weierstrassian one. For example, Leib-
niz’s law of continuity is more readily understood in terms of Robin-
son’s transfer principle than in any Archimedean terms. 4. The syn-
categorematic society seems to experience no inhibitions about inter-
preting Leibnizian infinitesimals in terms of alternating quantifiers (see
Section 3.7), which are conspicuously absent in Leibniz himself. Mean-
while, Robinson’s framework enables one to interpret them without al-
ternating quantifiers in a way closer to Leibniz’s own procedures. 5. On
several occasions Leibniz mentions a distinction between inassignable
numbers like dx or dy, and (ordinary) assignable numbers; see e.g., his
Cum Prodiisset [65] and Puisque des personnes . . . [66]. The distinction
has no analog in a traditional Weierstrassian framework. Meanwhile,
there is a ready analog of standard and nonstandard numbers, either
in Robinson’s [77] or in Nelson’s [71] framework for analysis with in-
finitesimals.
3.11. Are there gaps in Euclid? Some of the best work on ancient
Greece would possibly fail to satisfy Fried’s criteria for authentic his-
tory, such as de Risi’s monumental work ([35], 2016), devoted to the
reception of Euclid in the early modern age. Here de Risi writes:
Euclid’s system of principles has been repeatedly dis-
cussed and challenged: A few gaps in the proofs were
found . . . [35, p. 592].
This is a statement about Euclid and not merely its early modern
reception. Now wouldn’t the claim of the existence of a what is seen
today as a “gap” in Euclid be at odds with Fried’s tabula rasa axiom
(see Section 2.3)?
3.12. Philological thought experiment. Fried’s discussion is so gen-
eral as to raise questions about its utility. Dipert notes in his review
of the original 1981 edition of Mueller [70]:
It will be difficult in the coming years for anyone do-
ing serious research on Euclid, outside of the narrowest
philological studies, not first to have come to grips with
the present book, and it is to be hoped that this volume
will inject new vigor into discussions of Euclid by con-
temporary logicians and philosophers of mathematics.
(Dipert [36], 1981; emphasis on “philological studies”
added)
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Inspired by Dipert’s observation, we propose the following thought ex-
periment. Consider a hypothetical study of, say, the frequency of Greek
roots in the texts of ancient Greek mathematicians. Surely this is a
legitimate study in Philology. As far as Fried’s requirements for authen-
tic history, such a study would meet them with flying colors. Thus, the
satisfaction of the discontinuity axiom (see Section 2.1) is obvious. The
satisfaction of the tabula rasa axiom (see Section 2.3) is evident, seeing
that no modern mathematics is used at all in such a study. The risk
of a Platonist deviation (see Section 2.4) is infinitesimal. Freudenthal,
van der Waerden, and Weil may well have written on interpreting the
classics; but by Fried’s ideological criteria, our hypothetical philologi-
cal study would constitute legitimate mathematical history, surpassing
anything that such “privileged observers” may have written. Yet it
seems safe to surmise, following Dipert, that the audience for such a
philological study among those interested in the history of mathematics
would be limited.
4. Evolution of Unguru polarity
Fried admits in his 2018 essay that when he was a graduate student
under Unguru, it was axiomatic that there are only two approaches
to the history of mathemathics: that of a historian, and that of a
mathematician, as we show in Section 4.1.
4.1. Fried’s upgrade. In his 2018 article, Fried writes:
By the time I finished my Ph.D., I could make some
distinctions: I could divide historians of mathematics
into a mathematician type, such as Zeuthen or van der
Waerden, a historian type, like Sabetai Unguru, and,
perhaps, a postmodern type . . . ([47, p. 4])
The latter “type” is quickly dismissed as “not in fact a serious option”
leaving us with onlys two options, historian and mathematician. Fried
goes on to relate in his essay that he came to appreciate that the
historiographic picture is more complex, resulting in the novel labels
of mathematical conquerors, privileged observers, and the like. Such
a more complex picture is something of a departure from Unguruan
orthodoxy, as we analyze in Section 4.2.
4.2. Unguru polarity. In Section 4.1 we summarized Fried’s upgrade
of Unguru’s original framework. Meanwhile, Unguru himself sticks
to his guns as far as the original dichotomy of mathematician versus
historian is concerned. In his 2018 piece, Unguru reaffirms the idea
that there are only two approaches to the history of mathematics:
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The paper deals with two polar-opposite approaches to
the study of the history of mathematics, that of the
mathematician, tackling the history of his discipline,
and that of the historian. (Unguru 2018, [87], p. 17;
emphasis added)
Unguru proceeds to reveal further details on the alleged polarity:
[S]ince it is always possible to present past mathematics
in modern garb, ancient mathematical accomplishments
can be easily made to look modern and, therewith seam-
lessly integrated into the growing body of mathematical
knowledge. That this is a historical calamity is not the
mathematician’s worry . . . Never mind that this proce-
dure is tantamount to the obliteration of the history of
mathematics as a historical discipline. Why, after all,
should this concern the mathematician? [87, p. 20] (em-
phasis on historical in the original; emphasis on calamity
and obliteration added)
It seems to us that Unguru’s assumption that a mathematician does
not care about a possible “obliteration” of the history of mathematics
as a historical discipline, is unwarranted. We note that “calamity”
and “obliteration” are strong terms to describe the work of respected
scholars such as van der Waerden, Freudenthal, and others. We will
examine the issue in more detail in Section 4.3.
4.3. Polarity-driven historiography. What is the driving force be-
hind Unguru’s historiographic ideology, including his readiness to de-
scribe the two approaches as “antagonistic” (see Section 1.2)? The ide-
ological polarity postulated in Unguru’s approach appears to involve a
perception of class struggle, as it were, between historians (H-type, our
notation) and mathematicians (M-type, our notation) with their “an-
tagonistic” class interests. As we already noted in Section 1.3, M-type
as a class does not fare very well relative to the attribute of open-
mindedness in the FU ideology. For a detailed study of polarity-driven
historiography as applied to, or more precisely against, Felix Klein and
(in Unguru’s words) “the obliteration of the history of mathematics as
a historical discipline” by Mehrtens, see Bair et al. ([7], 2017).11
11Mehrtens ([69], 1990), in an avowedly marxist approach, postulates the exis-
tence of two polar-opposite attitudes among German mathematicians at the be-
ginning of the 20th century: modern (M-type, our notation) and countermodern
(C-type, our notation). Felix Klein had the bad luck of being pigeonholed as a C-
type, along with unsavory types like Ludwig Bieberbach and the SS-Brigadefu¨hrer
Theodor Vahlen. The value of such crude interpretive frameworks is limited.
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Unguru seeks to forefront the struggle between H-type and M-type as
the fundamental “antagonism” in terms of which all historical scholar-
ship must be evaluated, in an attitude reminiscent of the classic adage
“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class strug-
gles.” How fruitful is such a historiographic attitude? We will examine
the issue in the context of a case study in Section 4.4.
4.4. Is exponential notation faithful to Euclid? As a case study
illustrating his historiographic ideology, Unguru proposes an examina-
tion of Euclid’s Proposition IX.8, dealing with what would be called
today a geometric progression of lengths starting with the unity. Un-
guru already focused on this example over forty years ago in [84]. Para-
phrased in modern terms, the proposition asserts that in the geometric
progression, every other term is a square, every third term is a cube,
etc. Unguru [87] objects to reformulating the proposition in terms
of the algebraic properties of the exponential notation 1, a, a2, a3, . . .,
echoing the criticisms he already made in [84].
Why does Unguru feel that exponential notation must not be used
to reformulate Proposition IX.8? He provides a detailed explanation
in the following terms:
A proposition for the proof of which Euclid has to toil
subtly and painstakingly, and in the course of whose
proof he had to rely on many previous propositions and
definitions (e.g., VIII.22 and 23, def. VII.20) becomes a
trivial commonplace, which is an immediate outgrowth,
a trite after-effect, of our symbolic notation: 1, a, a2, a3,
a4, a5, a6, a7, . . . As a matter of fact, if we use modern
symbolism, this ceases altogether to be a proposition
and its truthfulness is an immediate and trivial applica-
tion of the definition of a geometric progression in the
particular case when the first member equals 1 and the
ratio, q = a, is a positive integer (for Euclid)! [87, p. 27]
(emphasis added)
Unguru claims that using exponential notation causes Euclid’s proposi-
tion to become a trivial commonplace severed from Euclid’s “previous
propositions,” and a trivial application of the definition of a geometric
progression. In this connection, Bl˚asjo¨ points out that
Unguru . . . mistakenly believes that certain algebraic
insights are somehow built into the notation itself. (Bl˚asjo¨
[15], 2016, p. 330)
Namely,
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The fact that, for example, a4 is a square is not by any
means implied by the symbolic notation itself. The fact
that axy = (ax)y is a contingent fact, a result that needs
proving. It is not at all obvious from the very notation
itself . . . (ibid.)
Thus, contrary to Unguru’s claim, Euclid’s Proposition IX.8 is not sev-
ered from Euclid’s “previous propositions” which are similarly more ac-
cessible to modern readers when expressed in modern notation, whose
properties require proof just as Euclid’s propositions do.
For instance, Proposition VIII.22 mentioned by Unguru asserts the
following: “If three numbers are in continued proportion, and the first is
square, then the third is also square.” In modern terminology this can
be expressed as follows: if a2 : b = b : c, then a2c = b2, and therefore c =
x2 for some x. Put another way, a2rr = (ar)2.12 This is not a triviality
but rather an identity that requires proof. Such an identity could
possibly be used in the proof of special cases of axy = (ax)y. For
more details see Mueller [70]. Unguru’s ideological opposition to using
modern exponential notation in this case has little justification.
It is a pity that (Unguru [87], 2018) chose not to address Bl˚asjo¨’s
rebuttal of his objections. Note that the rebuttal (Bl˚asjo¨ [15], 2016)
appeared two years earlier than Unguru’s piece.
4.5. What is an acceptable meta-language? In his 2018 piece,
Unguru reiterates a sweeping claim he already made in 1979:
The only acceptable meta-language for a historically
sympathetic investigation and comprehension of Greek
mathematics seems to be ordinary language, not alge-
bra. [87, p. 30].
Given such a stance, it is not surprising that Unguru opposes any
and all use of algebraic notation (including exponential notation) in
dealing with Euclid (see Section 4.4) and Apollonius (see Section 2.2).
However, Berggren notes in his review of (Unguru [86], 1979) that the
reason
why modern words, with the concepts they embody, are
acceptable as analytic tools where Renaissance (or even
Arabic) algebra is forbidden,13 is never explained [by
Unguru]. (Berggren [13], 1979)
12Here the first term in the progression is a square a2 by hypothesis. The second
term is a2r and the third term is (a2r)r. The identity a2rr = (ar)2 enables one to
conclude that the third term is also a square.
13We added the comma for clarity.
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The position of some other historians with regard to Unguru’s claims
is discussed in Section 5.
5. Do historians endorse Unguru polarity?
Unguru’s positing of a polarity of historian vs mathematician tends
to obscure the fact that a number of distinguished historians have
broken ranks with Unguru on the methodological issues in question,
such as the following scholars.
(1) Kirsti (Møller Pedersen) Andersen wrote a negative review of
Unguru’s polarity manifesto [84] for Mathematical Reviews,
noting in particular that Unguru “underestimates the histo-
rians’ [e.g., Zeuthen’s] understanding of Greek mathematics”
([1], 1975).
(2) C. M. Taisbak notes that Unguru and Rowe “are being ridicu-
lously unfair, to say the least, towards Heath at this point [con-
cerning interpretation of the Elements, items I44 and I45], to
say nothing of others” ([83], 1981).
(3) A´rpa´d Szabo´ receives the strongest endorsement from Unguru
in [84, pp. 78, 81]. Yet when Szabo´ analyzed Elements Book V
[82, p. 47], he employed symbolic notation introduced in the
19th century by Hermann Hankel.14 Such a practice is clearly
contrary to Unguru’s position on modern algebraic notation;
see Section 4.5. Unlike Unguru, Szabo´ treats van der Waerden’s
scholarship with respect and even relies on it (see Section 2.4).
(4) Christianidis [26, p. 36] proposes a distinction between premod-
ern algebra and modern algebra and argues that Diophantus can
be legitimately analyzed in terms of the former category (see
Section 2.6).
The present article is not a defense of the mathematician as math-
ematical historian. The main thrust of this article is the following.
The postulation of an ideological polarity of historian vs mathemati-
cian (the latter routinely suspected of a Platonist deviation) does more
harm than good in that it obscures the only possible basis for evaluat-
ing work in the history of mathematics, namely competent scholarship.
A mathematician who wishes to write about a historical figure, but is
insufficiently familiar with the historical period and/or the primary
documents, should be criticized as much as a historian insufficiently
14In more detail, Hankel ([56], 1874, pp. 389–404) introduced algebraic nota-
tion in an account of Euclid’s Elements book V. Furthermore, Heiberg ([57], 1883,
vol. II, s. 3) employed Hankel’s notation in his translation of Book V into Latin.
For more details see B laszczyk [18, p. 3, notes 5, 11].
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familiar with the mathematics to appreciate the fine points, and in-
deed the implicit aspects (as detailed e.g., in Bl˚asjo¨–Hogendijk [17]),
of what the historical figure actually wrote. The axioms of discontinuity
and tabula rasa and the positing of a polarity between mathematicians
and historians are of questionable value to the task of the history of
mathematics.
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